Moldova’s Rebel Region Stays Neutral in Russia’s War on Ukraine

Despite its reliance on Russia and reputation as a plaything of Moscow, Transnistria has important ties to Ukraine as well – which explains its current policy of staying out of the conflict.

Some fear that, following Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, Vladimir Putin may turn his attention to Moldova, and use the breakaway region of Transnistria as a pretext.

Adding fuel to the fire, Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko was recently seen presenting a map that implied Moldova may soon be attacked by Russia.

Such fears are not unfounded. Transnistria, which shares a border with Ukraine, secured de-facto independence from Moldova in 1992 thanks to assistance from the Russian military.

Despite being internationally unrecognized, it has survived for the past three decades with assistance from Moscow. Today, over 1,000 Russian troops are stationed in Transnistria. While elites in both Moscow and the Transnistrian capital Tiraspol insist that these troops are peacekeepers, some fear they could be used to destabilize Moldova or southwestern Ukraine.

However, while the authorities in Transnistria are undoubtedly pro-Russian, they have yet to officially endorse Russia’s recognition of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics in eastern Ukraine, or the subsequent invasion of Ukraine.

This is in contrast to Russia’s other allies, such as Belarus or Syria, which have signalled total support for Russia’s actions.

On the first day of the invasion, the de-facto President of Transnistria, Vadim Krasnoselsky, in a statement, neither endorsed nor condemned the war. He merely claimed that the situation in Transnistria remained stable, and assured citizens that a state of emergency would not be implemented. He also promised to open refugee centres for those fleeing Ukraine.

People sit in a sports hall that was transformed into a huge bedroom where over 500 people of Roma ethnicity who fled from Ukraine found shelter, in Chisinau, Moldova, 06 March 2022. Russian troops entered Ukraine on 24 February for a ‘special military operation,’ leading to a massive exodus of Ukrainians to neighboring countries as well as internal displacements. EPA-EFE/CIRO FUSCO

Following the invasion, the de-facto government and president himself were keen to show citizens that they were doing all they could for incoming refugees. The Transnistrian media published daily reports commending Krasnoselsky’s efforts to assist those that had arrived in Transnistria in search of refugee. News crews followed Krasnoselsky as he, his wife and daughter, inspected the various refugee centres and praised the president for assuming personal control of the body established to coordinate assistance for refugees.

Other prominent members of Transnistria’s government have also refrained from publicly endorsing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. When asked what Transnistria’s position on events in Ukraine was, the de-facto Foreign Minister, Vitaly Ignatiev, refused to take sides and said the government was primarily concerned with “ensuring the security of the country’s population”.

Transnistria accused Moldova and Ukraine of raising tensions. In a press release, Krasnoselsky criticized the Ukrainian media for speculating that Russian troops in Transnistria may be used to invade Ukraine. He also condemned the Ukrainian government for closing its border with Transnistria, claiming this had made it more difficult for Ukrainian citizens to find refuge.

Similarly, Ignatiev traveled to the Moldovan capital, Chisinau, to meet representatives of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, OSCE, and of the Moldovan government. During the meeting, Ignatiev criticized the Moldovan government for placing the Moldovan peacekeepers stationed near Moldova on high alert.

In the past few days, the authorities in Transnistria have issued sympathetic statements about the ongoing war in Ukraine. Krasnoselsky has referred to the war as “regrettable” and even as “tragic”. This is in stark contrast to the other pro-Russian separatist states, such as Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, which fully support the invasion of Ukraine.

So why have the authorities in Transnistria refused to endorse Russia’s attack on Ukraine, despite being reliant on Moscow? The answer is that Transnistria has deep historical, economic, political, and cultural ties to Ukraine.

Roughly one-third of Transnistria’s citizens are ethnic Ukrainians, while some 100,000 people living in the unrecognized state hold Ukrainian citizenship. Many of these people have family members and friends who live on the other side of the de-facto border.

Refugees from Ukraine cross the border with Moldova in Palanca, Moldova, 06 March 2022. Russian troops entered Ukraine on 24 February for a ‘special military operation,’ leading to a massive exodus of Ukrainians to neighboring countries as well as internal displacements. EPA-EFE/CIRO FUSCO

Many prominent figures in Transnistria are ethnic Ukrainians. Krasnoselsky identifies as an ethnic Ukrainian. The head coach at Transnistria’s most prominent football club, FC. Sheriff Tiraspol, which recently attained fame by beating Real Madrid in the Champions League, has left the club to participate in the defence of Ukraine.

Transnistrian separatists also legitimize the existence of their state by presenting it as the antithesis to the nation state. According to Transnistrian propaganda, Moldova is a nation state that discriminates against ethnic minorities. In contrast, the Transnistrian authorities claim they provide equal opportunities to all, irrespective of ethnicity.

Officially, Ukrainian is one of Transnistria’s three official languages, although, in practice, Russian predominates. Transnistria’s main university is named after famed Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko, who also appears on the 50-ruble note. There are multiple statues of Ukrainian heroes scattered around the region.

Moreover, during the Transnistrian war, the then government in Ukraine tacitly supported the separatists. Moldova regularly criticized Kyiv for doing little to stop the flow of weapons and fighters between Ukraine and Transnistria. For several months, a paramilitary group of Ukrainian citizens, known as the Ukrainian People’s Self-Defence Group, fought alongside the separatists. However, they were recalled by the Ukrainian government under pressure from its Moldovan counterpart.

Transnistria is also economically reliant on Ukraine for providing access to certain foreign markets. Although greater restrictions have come into place since the arrival of the EU Border Assistance Mission to Ukraine and Moldova in 2005, Ukraine is still one of Transnistria’s major trading partners. Annually, Transnistria exports more goods to Ukraine than it does to Russia. Several corruption scandals link Ukrainian and Transnistrian oligarchs. There are even accusations that former Ukrainian President, Petro Poroshenko, amassed his wealth from schemes in Transnistria.

The fact that Transnistria has not overtly supported Russia’s recognition of the Donetsk or Luhansk People’s Republic or Russia’s subsequent invasion of Ukraine is in line with the policy Krasnoselsky has pursued since he assumed office in 2016.

Soldiers of the unrecognised state of Transnistria take part in a military parade during the Independence Day celebration in Tiraspol city, 78 km East from Chisinau, Moldova, 02 September 2013. The Transnistria, Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic celebrated 23 years of self-styled independence on 02 September 2013. EPA/STRINGER

Since his election, Krasnoselsky has placed maintaining economic ties with Ukraine over offering overt support for Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. This has been a balancing act for Krasnoselsky, who has had to carefully choose his words so as not to offend either party.

Pressed by a journalist about who “owned” Crimea, he stated that it was a difficult situation, as both Ukraine and Russia thought it belonged to them. In 2017, Krasnoselsky stressed “that maintaining and furthering relations with Ukraine was one of Transnistria’s top priorities”.

Krasnoselsky is keen to distance Transnistria from the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics. On several occasions, he has implied that Transnistria’s emergence was organic and supported by the people, while the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics were manufactured and came about as a result of great power politics.

It is true that many former members from Transnistria’s parliament went to the Donbas to help the separatists establish their own governments. However, it is questionable how closely these figures are connected to the current regime in Tiraspol. Many of those who arrived in the Donbas were affiliated with Transnistria’s first de-facto President, Igor Smirnov, who left power in 2011. Towards the end of his 20-year rule, Smirnov became deeply unpopular in Transnistria, as did many of his associates. Like Smirnov, many of those who went to the Donbas have poor relations with the current government in Tiraspol.

Transnistria’s refusal to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is based on pragmatic, not ideological, considerations, however. There is little doubt that many in Tiraspol hope Russia’s invasion of Ukraine may lead to Moscow annexing Transnistria.

Moreover, Transnistria’s plea for recognition as a state after Moldova applied for EU membership demonstrated that Tiraspol wishes to remain within Russia’s sphere of influence.

Nevertheless, given Transnistria’s close historical, political, social, and economic ties to Ukraine, the elites in Transnistria cannot afford to support Russia’s actions overtly.

This may change if Russia signals its intent to annex Transnistria formally. Until then, Tiraspol will likely try to maintain its neutral position.

Keith Harrington is NUI Travelling Scholar in Humanities and Social Sciences,PhD Candidate, History Department, Centre for European and Eurasian Studies, Maynooth University.

The opinions expressed in the Comment section are those of the authors only and do not necessarily reflect the views of BIRN.

Keith Harrington

Follow us